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Abstract. We present an approach to automating computationally sound
proofs of key exchange protocols based on public-key encryption. We
show that satisfying the property called occultness in the Dolev–Yao
model guarantees the security of a related key exchange protocol in a
simple computational model. Security in this simpler model has been
shown to imply security in a Bellare–Rogaway-like model. Furthermore,
the occultness in the Dolev–Yao model can be searched automatically
by a mechanisable procedure. Thus automated proofs for key exchange
protocols in the computational model can be achieved. We illustrate the
method using the well-known Lowe–Needham–Schroeder protocol.
1 Introduction
Proving security of cryptographic protocols and verifying those proofs is a hard,
time-consuming and error-prone task when done by hand. Many flaws in security
proofs were found after the proofs have been accepted and published [11, 10]. As
a consequence, automated proofs have been considered a promising solution.
Research on automated proofs in Dolev–Yao models [16] has a long history
thanks to the model’s simplicity. Although this simplicity means sacrificing the
faithfulness of the model, such automated tools have brought many significant
successes in finding flaws. A well-known example is the Needham–Schroeder
public-key protocol that was believed to be secure for many years until an attack
was found by Lowe [19]. On the other hand, such tools cannot guarantee security
in a computational sense, since Dolev–Yao models do not capture computational
attacks defined in the usual cryptographic models.
Some automatic approaches for more realistic computational models have
been proposed recently, shedding some light on this problem. However, the num-
ber of approaches and the types of protocol they can be applied on is still limited.
Contribution. This paper shows how we can automate the verification of security
of key exchange protocols based on public key encryption. The security proofs
achieved are computationally sound. The basic idea is as follows.
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– Kudla and Paterson proposed a modular way to prove security of key agree-
ment protocols [18]. According to their approach, a security proof in the
BR2000 model [2] is reduced to the hardness of a gap problem if we can
show that the security of a simpler protocol in a simpler (computational)
model is reduced to hardness of the related computational problem.
– Cortier et al. showed that we can automate secrecy proofs of public-key-
based protocols [12]. Their idea results in a mechanisable search procedure
for a property called occultness. However, their work is based on Dolev-Yao
model.
– Our contribution provides a link between these two results. We show that
security of a public-key-based protocol which has been checked to be occult
in the simpler computational model is reduced to the hardness of a computa-
tional problem, which we construct using an IND-CCA encryption scheme.
Therefore, to check the security proof in the BR2000 model, we can use the
automatic tool by Cortier et al. [12] to check occultness.
Related work. Research on computationally sound automated proofs for crypto-
graphic systems falls into two broad directions: direct proofs on computational
models and indirect proofs via Dolev–Yao models.
Direct approaches. Direct approaches reason on protocol specifications often
written in a programming language that has a computational semantics.
Courant et al. [14] designed a Hoare-style logic to verify computational in-
variants, e.g. indistinguishability. However, this work can verify IND-CCA
security only of an encryption scheme that is constructed from a trapdoor
permutation. Later, Gagne´ et al. [17] extended this work to symmetric block
ciphers. Blanchet [5] designed a variant of pi-calculus to formalise games,
and developed CryptoVerif, a tool that can automatically transform games
using game-hopping techniques, thereby freeing the human from the mun-
dane parts of the proof. CryptoVerif can be potentially extended to cover
many types of protocols, but it is hard to make it fully automated, i.e. man-
ual guidance is required in non-trivial situations. Datta et al. [15] tuned
the Computational Protocol Composition Logic for verifying key exchange
protocols, resulting in security proofs in the Bellare-Rogaway model [3]. How-
ever, their work is limited to Diffie–Hellman-based protocols and although
they claimed the work is mechanisable, they have not shown how to do it in
details or provided an actual tool.
Indirect approaches. In contrast, indirect approaches exploit automated tools
designed for verifying properties in Dolev–Yao models by showing in which
cases symbolic properties imply computational ones. Cortier and Warinschi
[13] proved the computational soundness of a Dolev–Yao model, by showing
how to map between symbolic and computational traces. They also tested
their idea by using Casrul [9], a Dolev–Yao-based tool to make a Dolev–
Yao security proof. That work differs from ours in the models used. The
Dolev-Yao model they used is the model for Carsul, a protocol verifier for a
fixed number of sessions, while the Dolev–Yao model we use is the model for
Securify [12], a tool that gives proofs for an unbounded number of sessions
and adversarial operations. In the other side, the computational model they
designed is a more general and simpler, e.g. no session corruption, but the
one we use, the BR2000 model [2], which is designed specifically for key
exchanges.
Canetti and Herzog [6] used ProVerif [4] to automatically verify some sym-
bolic criteria and showed that a protocol satisfying such criteria realises an
ideal functionality for key exchange protocols. This work focuses on public-
key-based key exchange protocols like our work, but the two results are
not strictly comparable. Canetti and Herzog use the universal composabil-
ity (UC) model with a UC-secure public-key encryption scheme which is a
stronger security than we use since it allows security under composability.
At the same time their model is weaker than ours because they do not model
adaptive corruptions and session key reveals. We also note that Canetti and
Krawczyk [8] have shown that universal composability can be obtained for
‘free’ for a slightly weaker functionality. Canetti and Herzog [6] proved that
strong secrecy (an equivalence property), or observational equivalence be-
tween processes that have different values for a secret variable, implies UC-
security. We prove that occultness, which means standard secrecy (a trace
property and a less strong notion), implies security in the Bellare–Rogaway
model.
Later, Canetti and Gajek extended the work [7] to deal with key exchange
based on key encapsulation and signature schemes. With this type of pro-
tocols, they consider adaptive corruptions, session key reveals, and forward
secrecy in the model. The authors also showed that the plain Diffie-Hellman
protocol realizes their key encapsulation functionality, thus the result is




Gap problems were first mentioned by Okamoto and Pointcheval [22]. We sum-
marize the idea here. Let f : X × Y → {0, 1} be any relation on sets X and
Y .
– The computational problem of f is: given x ∈ X, find any y ∈ Y such that
f(x, y) = 1 if such a y exists, otherwise return Fail.
– The decisional problem of f is: given (x, y) ∈ X×Y , to decide if f(x, y) = 1
or not.
Definition 1. The gap problem of f is: given the decisional oracle of f, to solve
the computational problem.
2.2 A Modular Proof for Key Agreement
Kudla and Paterson proposed a modular way to prove security of key exchange
protocols in a modified Bellare-Rogaway (mBR) model [18]. We use their idea in
this work with a little simplification, in that we do not consider any corrupted
oracle to be a fresh one because we do not model key compromise imperson-
ation attacks. We call our mode mBR′ model to differentiate it from Kudla and
Paterson’s.
The mBR′ Game. Denote the set of participants IDs as U and assume each
participant U ∈ U has a public key PU and a private key SU . We use ΠiU to
denote the oracle of the ith instance of U . An oracle ΠiU may accept once at
any time. After that it holds a role role ∈ {initiator, responder}, a partner ID
pid, a session ID sid and a session key seskey. Each oracle follows the protocol
rules and responds to input messages from the adversary. Each oracle ΠiU also
stores a public transcript TΠiU that records all messages sent and received by
that oracle.
The game is played between a challenger C and an adversary E. C runs a
Setup algorithm on security parameter k, generating public parameters, a set
of participants U and oracles {ΠiU}, distributing long-term keys to participants,
and selecting a bit b. E is also given all public keys and access to all oracles,
including random oracles.
Adversarial Queries. The adversary can make the following queries.
– Send(U, i,M): E gives the oracle ΠiU a message M . If this oracle’s pid = U
′,
then ΠiU assumes that M is from U
′ and acts according to the protocol. For
initiating oracles, E can make a special Send query λ, which tells ΠiU to set
roleU = initiator. If Π
i
U did not receive a message λ as the first message,
roleU will be responder.
– Reveal(U, i): E uses this query to obtain the session key of ΠiU (if any).
– Corrupt(U): This allows E to learn U ’s long-term key.
Oracle States. An oracle ΠiU can be in the following states.
– Accepted: An oracle is in this state if it has received a properly constructed
messages to make a session key and the oracle accepts the key.
– Rejected: An oracle is in this state if it decides not to establish a session
key and abort the protocol.
– Revealed: An oracle is in this state if it has answered a Reveal query.
– Corrupted: An oracle is in this state if U has answered a Corrupt query.
Partnership. Two oraclesΠiU , holding (seskey, sid, pid) andΠ
j
U ′ , holding (seskey
′, sid′, pid′)
are said to be partners if they have accepted and:
1. sid = sid′, seskey = seskey′, pid = U ′, pid′ = U ;
2. roleU = initiator and roleU ′ = responder or vice versa;
3. no other oracle has accepted with session ID equals sid.
Freshness. An oracle ΠiU is fresh if it and its partner Π
j
U ′ (if any) are not
revealed and neither U nor U ′ is corrupted.
Test Query. After E has made a polynomial number of queries in k, E can make
a Test query to an oracle ΠiU , which must be accepted and fresh. If b = 0 then
ΠiU outputs a randomly chosen session key seskeyrandom, otherwise it outputs
its real session key seskeyΠiU .
After that, E can continue querying, but not reveal or corrupt the test oracle
or its partner. Finally, E outputs his guess b′ for b. E’s advantage, denoted
AdvantageE(k), is |1/2− Pr[b′ = b]|.
Definition of Security. A benign adversary is one who just relays messages
between parties without any modification. Then the security definition for au-
thenticated key exchange (AKE) is defined as follows.
Definition 2. A protocol is an mBR′-secure AKE protocol if:
1. in the presence of a benign adversary, two oracles running the protocol ac-
cept and hold the same session key and session ID, and the session key is
distributed uniformly at random on {0, 1}k; and
2. for any adversary E, AdvantageE(k) is negligible.
The cNR-mBR′ Model. The cNR-mBR′ model is the same as mBR′, except:
– the adversary cannot make any Reveal query;
– instead of a normal Test query, the adversary selects an accepted and fresh
oracle ΠiU and outputs a guess seskey for the oracle’s session key seskeyΠiU .
Then AdvantageE(k) = Pr[seskey = seskeyΠiU ].
Following the technique of Kudla and Paterson [18], a protocol Π defined in
the mBR′ model can be first proven secure in the cNR-mBR′ model, which is
simpler. We will define a compiler to promote such a protocol to one secure in the
mBR′ model as long as the protocol Π produces a session string ssΠ and uses a
hash function, which is modelled as a random oracle, to finally compute a hashed
session key. We also use Kudla and Paterson’s notion of strong partnering.
If a protocol has strong partnering, the adversary cannot trivially win the
game by making two oracles, which are not partners, have the same session key
and then using the Reveal query. Strong partnering can always be achieved by
including partnering information in the session string; specifically we add the
session identifier and the identity of the initiator and responder to the session
string.
Definition 3 ([18]). If Π is a key exchange protocol and there exists an adver-
sary E, who plays the mBR′ game with Π, and with non-negligible probability
(in security parameter k) can make any two oracles ΠiU and Π
j
U ′ accept and hold
the same session key when they are not partners, then we say that Π has weak
partnering. Otherwise Π has strong partnering.
Definition 4. Suppose Π is a key exchange protocol. The session string deci-
sional problem for protocol Π is: given an oracle ΠiU and its transcript T
i
U in
the mBR′ model, public keys PU and PU ′ (where pidiU = U
′) and s, to decide
whether s is the session string of ΠiU or not.
In order to use the cNR-mBR′ model, given a protocol Π, we define a protocol
pi to be the same as Π, except that the session key of pi is the session string of
Π.
Theorem 1. Suppose that a key exchange protocol Π uses a hash function H
to compute a hashed session key on completion of the protocol and Π has strong
partnering. If the cNR-mBR′ security of the related protocol pi is probabilistic
polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the computational problem of some
relation f , and the session string decisional problem for Π is polynomial time re-
ducible to the decisional problem of f , then the mBR′ security of Π is probabilis-
tic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the gap problem of f , assuming
that H is a random oracle.
Proof. The proof for the original mBR model is given by Kudla and Paterson
[18]. The proof for mBR′ is essentially the same. The idea of the proof is simple.
Assume that there is an adversary A, given an algorithm E that can win cNR-
mBR game, can solve the computational problem. Now we have to show that
we can construct an algorithm B, given the decisional problem oracle and an
adversary D that can win mBR game, can solve the computational problem.
Thus, the heart of the idea is to use D and the decisional problem oracle to
simulate E, and make A solve the computational problem for B.
Notice that in our model mBR′ (hence in cNR-mBR′ also) we do not consider
a corrupted oracle to be a fresh one. However, while simulating E, B passes all
Corrupt queries from D to A blindly, therefore this difference does not matter.
2.3 Chosen Ciphertext Security in the Multi-user Setting
For the simulation in our proof (see Section 3.3), we need an encryption scheme
that is secure even if the adversary can ask for more than one challenging ci-
phertext encrypted by more than one public key. This is call indistinguishability
under chosen ciphertext attack in the multi-user setting (IND-CCA-M) [1]. For-
tunately, adaptive CCA security also implies such kind of security.
Definition 5 (IND-CCA-M).
For all equal-length strings m0, m1 and any b ∈ {0, 1}, the left or right
selector LR is defined as
LR(m0,m1, b) = mb.
For a bit b that is unknown to the adversary, a LR encryption oracle EpkLR(·, ·, b),
given query (m0,m1) where m0,m1 are two equal-length plaintexts, first sets
mb ← LR(m0,m1, b), then outputs the encryption of mb using the public key pk.
A decryption oracle Dsk(·), given a valid ciphertext c, outputs the correspond-
ing decryption of c using the secret key sk.
We have the following experiment. Let PE = (K, E ,D) be a public-key en-
cryption scheme. The adversary, Acca, has access to n LR encryption oracles
EpkiLR(·, ·, b) and n corresponding decryption oracles Dski(·), where Acca is not
allowed to query Dski(·) on an output of EpkiLR(·, ·, b). Let I be some initial
information string. For b ∈ {0, 1}, we have
Expn−ccaPE,I (Acca, b)
For i= 1, . . . , n do (pki, ski)← K(I) EndFor
d← AEpk1LR(·,·,b),...,EpknLR(·,·,b),Dsk1 (·),...,Dskn (·)cca (I, pk1, . . . , pkn)
Return d
The advantage of Acca is defined as
Advn−ccaPE,I (Acca) = Pr[Exp
n−cca
PE,I (Acca, 0) = 0]− Pr[Expn−ccaPE,I (Acca, 1) = 0]
We say that PE is secure against chosen ciphertext attack in the multi-user
setting if for all Acca and polynomial n, {Advn−ccaPE,I (Acca)} is negligible.
Lemma 1 ([1]). If an encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure then it is IND-
CCA-M secure.
2.4 An Automatic Search Procedure in Dolev Yao model
Cortier et al. [12] proposed an automatic procedure that checks whether or not a
protocol has the property called occult, which has been proved to imply secrecy
in the Dolev–Yao model. We will briefly introduce the idea here.
Message Fields. Fields is the set of messages, which can be either primitive or
compound fields. A primitive field’s type can be one of Agent , Key , Nonce. Key
and Nonce make the set Basic, the only set in which a field can be designated
as secret. As a notational convention, variables A,B and variants denote agents;
K and variants denotes keys.
Each agent A has a public key pub(A) and the related private-key prv(A).
Each key K has an inverse key K−1, i.e. pub(A)−1 = prv(A) and prv(A)−1 =
pub(A).
Events and Global States. The system state is represented by a set of ordered
events. There are three kinds of events: messages, spells and states.
– A message event is just a field that is the content of a sent message.
– A spell event C = (S,L) ∈ Spells where the book Book(C) = S, is a set of
basic secrets shared among a set of agents Cabal(C) = L.
– A state event is of the form An(X) where A is a role, n is the protocol step
of role A and X is the concatenated field in memory held by the state. The
set of basic secrets of a spell is made up by its book and long-term (private)
keys of its cabal.
Sec(C) = Book(C) ∪ ltk(Cabal(C))




= H ∩ Fields




= {X ∈ Basic|X /∈ parts(Cont(H)), X /∈ (Sec(H))}
where parts(.) is defined in the following paragraph.
Inductive Relations.
– parts(S) is the set of all sub-fields of fields in S (not including keys of en-
cryptions).
– analz(S) is the subset of parts(S) having only subfields that are accessible to
adversary.
– synth(S) is the set of all fields constructible from S by concatenation and





– An ideal I is the set of fields that must be protected in order to protect
secrets in S. It is the smallest superset of S such that the concatenation
[X,Y ] ∈ I(S) if X ∈ I(S) and Y ∈ I(S), and {X}K ∈ I(S) if X ∈ I(S)
and K−1 /∈ I(S).
– The coideal C(S) is the complement of I(S).
Protocols. A protocol specification is made up by a set of transitions. A transition
is of the form Pre(t)
New(t)−→ Post(t), where Pre(t) and Post(t) are sets of events
and New(t) is a new set of nonces.
Except for the initialisation transition, a transition t shows a state change of
one role. A message or post spell (but not both) may be introduced in Post(t).
One restriction is that secrets in a post spell must be in New(t). One condi-
tion for protocol security is regularity, implying that there is no long-term key
introduced into a post message.
Global State Transitions. Given a protocol P and a set of initial knowledge I of
the adversary, the global succession relation defines how a state H is transformed
to a new state H ′ as follows.
– H ′ is an honest successor of H, if there is an applicable transition t in P
such that H ′ = (H\(Pre(t)∩ States))∪Post(t). A transition t is applicable
in H if Pre(t) ⊆ H and New(t) ⊆ unused(H)
– H ′ is a fake successor of H, if there exists a field X ∈ fake(Cont(H) ∪ I)
such that H ′ = H ∪ {X}.
The set of reachable states from P and I is denoted by reachable(P, I).
Requirement for Secrecy. A spell is compatible with initial knowledge I if I does
not have any of its basic secrets.
compatible(I)
def
= {C|Sec(C) ∩ parts(I) = ∅}
Given adversarial initial knowledge I, a global state H is called I-discreet if
Cont(H) ⊆ C(Sec(C)) for any I-compatible spell C ∈ H.
Definition 6. A P -configuration is a tuple (I,H,C) in which H ∈ reachable(P, I),
H is I-discreet, C ∈ compatible(I), and C ∈ H. A protocol P is occult if for
all P -configuration(I,H,C) and for every transition t ∈ P ,
Cont(Post(t)) ⊆ C(Sec(C)).
Millen et al. [21] give a secrecy theorem saying that if a protocol is occult then
it provides secrecy (in a Dolev–Yao style model). More importantly, Cortier et al.
[12] proposed an automatic search procedure to check if a protocol has occultness.
This result is very important for our work, because later we will show that if
a protocol has occultness and passes some simple checks, that protocol is also
secure in the cNR-mBR′ model.
3 Security in the cNR-mBR′ Model
In this section, we show that the property occultness also implies security in the
cNR-mBR model under a condition that both initiator and responder provide
nonces for building the session key. We consider only protocols that are based on
public-key encryption, i.e. every message includes only fields that can be nonces,
party IDs, concatenation or encryption of other fields.
Definition 7. A two-party protocol is said to be based on public-key encryption
if every message m is constructed by the following syntax:
m ::= nonce | partyID | Encpk(m) | concat(m,m),
where nonce is a random number, partyID is a party ID number, Enck(.) is en-
cryption under the public key pk and concat(., .) is concatenation of two fields.
3.1 Occultness Property in cNR-mBR′ Model
In this section we link Dolev-Yao occultness property with some property in
our computational models. Those computational properties will be useful for
establishing security proofs in the cNR-mBR′ model later.
Lemma 2. If a protocol pi has the occult property, then any secret nonce sent
between parties is always encrypted.
Proof. Informally, occultness implies secrecy (in Dolev-Yao models), therefore it
must also imply that no secret nonce is sent in the plain form (otherwise the
adversary can learn it easily).
Assume that there is transition t, where Post(t) contains a message event
whose fields include a nonce r (in the plain form). Because r must be kept secret,
there must be a spell event C where r ∈ Sec(C). This means r ∈ I(Sec(C)), i.e.
r /∈ C(Sec(C)). Therefore, Post(t) /∈ C(Sec(C)), i.e. Cont(Post(t)) /∈ C(Sec(C)).
But this means the protocol is not occult.
Lemma 3. Suppose a protocol pi has the occult property in the Dolev-Yao model,
and the underlying public key encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure. Consider
any oracle ΠiZ in the cNR-mBR
′ model, whose pid is V , where Z and V have not
been corrupted. Then with a negligible probability a ciphertext of a nonce created
by ΠiZ appears (in a transcript), where that ciphertext is not made either by an
oracle of Z whose pid is V or by an oracle of V whose pid is Z.
Proof (Sketch). Because of the scope of this paper, we will explain the outline of
the proof. This lemma is only for a specific case of linking two trace properties,
which are enough for our work, between Dolev-Yao and computational models.
The idea of proof is based on the trace mapping technique, which has been fully
demonstrated by Micciancio and Warinschi [20] for the general case (the models
they used are very similar our models here). The intuitive idea behind the proof
is: if the adversary is the first to make such a ciphertext, then we can break
IND-CCA security; on the other hand, if any party oracle is the first to make
such a ciphertext, then the protocol is not occult.
Assume the Lemma is false, then let c be the first such ciphertext. There are
two cases: c is created by the adversary or c is created by a party oracle.
First we examine the former case, i.e. there is an adversary A who plays
the cNR-mBR′ can make c with a non-negligible probability. Now we show that
we can construct an algorithm G that can have non-negligible advantage in the
experiment Exp2−ccaPE,I (Acca, b) (see Section 2.3) as follows.
– G creates a cNR-mBR′ game, and choose two parties Z and V to replace their
public keys with the public keys from the experiment Exp2−ccaPE,I (Acca, b).
– Because G has public keys and decryption oracles of Z and V and all of
public and secret keys of other parties, the cNR-mBR′ game can be simulated
perfectly except for either an oracle of Z, whose pid is V or an oracle of V ,
whose pid is Z.
– For such an oracle, G prepares two sets of nonces. While simulating it, G
always uses the corresponding encryption oracle EpkiLR(·, ·, b) whenever G
needs encrypting. Notice that G never has to encrypt any of those nonces
under a public key not of Z and V , because we are assuming the adversary
is the first one to do it. In addition, G never has to use a plain nonce, but
its encryption, according to Lemma 2. Therefore, even G does not know
which set of nonce is actually used, but the simulation is still perfect, until
c appears.
– A can still corrupt any party but not Z and V .
– When c appears, G submits it to the decryption oracle of Z, then G can
guess the bit b correctly.
Second, lets examine the latter case, i.e. a party oracle ΠjY , whose pid is X,
is the first to break the property by creating c under the public key of X, where
{Y,X} is not {Z, V } or {V,Z}. Notice that Y must be either Z or V , because
before ΠjY makes c, Π
j
Y must have received another encryption from Z or V
1.
We show that it is possible to construct a situation in the Dolev-Yao model, in
which the protocol is not occult. First, for every bitstring value, including nonces
and party IDs, we map it to a symbolic value. Now, in the Dolev-Yao model,
we start with a situation when all parties are corrupted but Z, V . The Dolev-
Yao adversary has to make the same transcripts as he did in the computational
model, but now with symbolic values. We have to make sure that he is able to do
that. Obviously, there is no problem for creating transcripts between Z or V with
another party, because that party is corrupted. For any thing in any transcript
between Z and V , if that is related to any nonce created by Z and V , then the
Dolev-Yao adversary must be able to make the symbolic version, because he has
corrupted all other parties except Z and V . In the other case, if that thing is
related to a nonce created by an oracle of Z, whose pid is V and vice versa, we
argue that the Dolev-Yao adversary is also able to create the symbolic version.
Assume the contrary, then there is a bitstring that the Dolev-Yao adversary
can not make the symbolic version. Then, in the experiment Exp2−ccaPE,I (Acca, b)
above, given that bistring we can always use the decryption oracles to recursively
decrypt ciphertexts. For any ciphertext that is not allowed to be decrypted by the
decryption oracles, we skip it. There must be a ciphertext, that can be decrypted
by the decryption oracles, giving us the hidden nonce in Exp2−ccaPE,I (Acca, b) (if
there is no such a ciphertext, there would not be any problem for the Dolev-Yao
adversary to make symbolic versions of transcript).
Now we have a situation in the Dolev-Yao model, where we have an instance
of party Y sends out a ciphertext of a nonce, which has been created by Z,
under the public key of X (where X is not Z). But this means the protocol is
not occult.
3.2 Hard Problems Used for Security Proofs
According to the modular approach [18] that we are following, we need a set of
computational, decisional and gap problems, which must be hard. Now we define
the following problems and show that IND-CCA implies the hardness of them.
Informally, the computational problem we are going to define is based on the
encryption property one-wayness under adaptively chosen ciphertext attack in
the multi-user setting (OW-CCA-M). In this attack, we ask the adversary to find
the plaintext of a random ciphertext, while allowing him to get the ciphertext of
any message related to the hidden message, in a two-user setting. And, because
1 otherwise ΠjY has no information about nonces in c, because the adversary has not
faked any such an encryption
IND-CCA implies IND-CCA-M, we just have to show that IND-CCA-M implies
OW-CCA-M. Then the decisional and gap problems are defined accordingly.
Definition 8. Given a public-key encryption scheme PE with plaintext and ci-
phertext spaces MPE and CPE , and a pair of public and secret keys (pkz, skz),
we define the following relation f :
f : (MPE × CPE)→ {0, 1},
where f(m, c) =
{
1 if Dskz (c) = m
0 otherwise
Now we can define our problems.
Let Epkz I(·, ·, ·) be an “inserting” encryption oracle of pkz, which on input
(m1, Epkz (m2),m3), outputs Epkz (m1,m2,m3); and Epkvpkz C(·) be a “converting”
encryption oracle from pkz to pkv, which on input Epkv (m), outputs Epkz (m).
The adversary is given the public key pkz, an additional public key pkv and all
corresponding decryption, inserting and converting oracles of pkz and pkv, where
the decryption oracles never answer if input is from the inserting or converting
oracles. We have the following problems of PE.
– Computational problem: The adversary is given c to compute m such that
f(m, c) = 1.
– Decisional problem: The adversary is given c and m to determine if
f(m, c) = 1 or not.
– Gap problem: Given an oracle that can solve the decisional problem above
and c, to compute m such that f(m, c) = 1.
Here the decryption oracle Dskz (·) never decrypts c or any ciphertext from
any oracles.
Lemma 4. If the underlying encryption scheme is IND-CCA, the problems in
Definition 8 are hard.
Proof. We have shown that IND-CCA implies IND-CCA-M (see Section 2.3).
Therefore, what we have to show is that solving any of the problems above is at
least as hard as winning the IND-CCA-M game.
Given an algorithm E that can solve one of the problems above, we con-
struct an algorithm F that can have non-negligible advantage in the experiment
Exp2−ccaPE,I (Acca, b) (see Section 2.3).
The construction is as follows. F picks a pair of messages (m0,m1) randomly,
then submits them to Epk1LR(·, ·, b) and then forwards the output c as the chal-
lenge ciphertext to E. Now, F has to simulate all necessary oracles that E needs.
For any decryption request, F just forwards it to the decryption oracle in the ex-
periment. For requests to inserting and converting oracles, because F can submit
any message to oracles EpkzLR and EpkvLR, F can also simulate those oracles.
We examine each case as follows.
– If E can solve the computational problem, i.e. output mb, F can see mb to
guess b correctly.
– If E can solve the decisional problem, F just asks E if m0 or m1 is actually
encrypted. Therefore F can guess b correctly.
– If E can solve the gap problem, F must simulate the decisional oracle. Given
a request to the decisional oracle including a ciphertext c and a plaintext m,
if c is not an output of any oracle EpkzLR, F can use Dskz (·) to check the
plaintext. Otherwise, if m is one of the two possible plaintexts of c (F must
know them), F just outputs Yes. In this latter case, the probability that F
simulates the decisional oracle wrongly is negligible, i.e. m is m1−b, because
c contains no information of m1−b.
Finally, F can see the output of E to guess b correctly.
3.3 Our Main Theorem
Theorem 2. Suppose a protocol pi is occult and based on an IND-CCA public-
key encryption scheme, each side sends out at least one nonce, and the session
key includes all exchanged nonces. Then the security of pi in the cNR-mBR′ model
is probabilistic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the corresponding
computational problem (according to Definition 8).
Proof. Assume that there is an adversary A that participates in pi in the cNR-
mBR′ model and outputs the session key with a non-negligible probability A in
a time τA, where k is the security parameter. We will show that we can build
an adversary B who solves the computational problem, i.e. given a ciphertext c,
output the plaintext m of c using some oracles, with some probability g(A) and
in time h(τA) where g and h are polynomial functions.
The idea behind the reduction is as follows. B will try to make a session
key of an oracle of Z, whose pid is V , to contain m. Without knowing m and
the secret key used to decrypt c, B can still do that by using inserting and
converting oracles to simulate the transcript of that oracle, as long as the oracle
and its partner have not been corrupted. Fortunately, according to Lemma 3,
B never has to simulate a ciphertext of m under another key except PZ and
PV (otherwise the simulation fails because B does not know m). Finally, if A
chooses that oracle to test, then the guess of the session key from A will help B
to output m.
Now we formally describe how B works. As we have defined the computa-
tional problem of f , B is given the public key pkz, which has been used to make
c, an additional public key pkv and all corresponding decryption, inserting and
converting oracles. B makes the cNR-mBR′ game as follows.
– Setting up: B runs a Setup(k) algorithm to set up a set of participants {U},
their oracles and long-term keys for each participant as defined in Section 2.2.
Then B chooses randomly two parties Z and V , replaces their public keys
with pkz and pkv respectively. After that, B picks randomly a party oracle
ΠjZ , whose pid is V .
Finally B gives all public keys to A.
– Answering queries:
• Send(U, i, M):
∗ If this is the query for ΠjZ , i.e. U = Z and i = j, where after that ΠjZ
has to reply the first message containing a nonce (in an encrypted
form, see Lemma 8), then ΠjZ considers the hidden m as his first
nonce and starts using corresponding inserting and converting oracles
to make valid replies.
Notice that if ΠjZ has not been required to use any nonce, then the
inserting and converting oracles have not been used any time.
∗ If no ciphertext inside M is from any inserting or converting ora-
cles that B has been given (to solve the computational problem),
then B can parse all the content M by using relevant secret keys or
decryption oracles.
Now there are two cases:
· When B is parsing M , if there is a nonce that is supposed to
be the hidden m, then B puts the party oracle ΠiU in the state
Rejected, because according to Lemma 3, M is an invalid mes-
sage with an overwhelming probability.
· Otherwise, B keeps simulating according to the protocol specifi-
cation.
∗ If there is at least one ciphertext inside M that is from any inserting
or converting oracles that B has been given, then certainly B knows
what is the next state of ΠiU (B knows m is inside, B just does
not know what m is). But it maybe a problem if ΠiU has to reply
something containing m.
Now, according to Lemma 3, B never have to make a ciphertext of
m under a key different from PZ or PV . And to make a ciphertext of
m under PZ or PV , B uses relevant inserting and converting oracles.
• Corrupt(U):
∗ If U = Z or U = V , then B stops using A and output randomly one
bit b′.
∗ Otherwise B just gives A the corresponding private key.
– Finally, A must choose an accepted and fresh oracle and output his guess
for the session key.
Suppose the number of participants is npar and each party may have nses
sessions, where npar and nses are polynomial functions of k.
With a non-negligible probability 1npar.nses , Π
j
Z is the oracle chosen by A.
In this case, B just extracts all nonces from the session key outputted by
A and outputs the nonce which is supposed to be m (Since the session key
is made of nonces from both sides, it must contains m). Therefore, if ΠjZ is
chosen, the probability that B wins is η1 = A.
Otherwise, B just stops using A and outputs a random guess. Therefore, if
ΠjZ is not chosen, the probability that B wins is η2 and negligible.




, in a time h(τA) where h(.) is a polynomial function.
4 Automated Proofs in the mBR′ Model
4.1 The Session String Decisional Problem
In order to establish security in the mBR′ model from security in the cNR-mBR′
model, we need to show that while we are making a reduction from the gap
problem to mBR′-security, we must be able to solve the session string decisional
problem [18]. The following lemma shows that we can do it with any public-key-
based protocol.
Lemma 5. Given all the public and private keys used in an mBR′ game, except
the private key of an arbitrary party Z, and the oracle for the decisional prob-
lem of f based on public and private key of Z, there exists a polynomial time
algorithm S to solve the session string decisional problem in the mBR′ game.
Proof. Since S has all public and private keys except the secret key of Z, S can
open all ciphertexts with the exception of any ciphertext made under the public
key of Z. However, for such a ciphertext, S can always use the decisional problem
of f to check if a nonce is the plaintext or not. Therefore, S can always solve
the session string decisional problem in the mBR′ game in polynomial time.
4.2 How to Automate Proofs
According to the Theorem 1, in order to show the mBR′ security of a key ex-
change protocol Π that is based on an IND-CCA public-key encryption scheme
and computes a session key by hashing, we have to do the following.
– Show that in the case of a benign adversary the protocol completes correctly
with a random key (see Section 2.2).
– Show that Π has strong partnering. We can always have this property if we
add partnering information into the session string (see Section 2.2).
– Show that the cNR-mBR′ security of the related “no-hashing” protocol pi is
probabilistic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the computational
problem. First we check if both sides contribute nonces (very easily checked)
and then we use the automatic tool by Cortier et al [12] to check occultness.
We do not have to show that given the decisional problem oracle of f , we
can solve the session string decisional problem, because it is done by Lemma 5.
Although there a number of steps, they can be done quickly or automatically.
Checking the occultness property is the only difficult step but it can be auto-
mated.
Example 1. Suppose we want to prove the following key exchange protocol Π,
which is based on Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol. There are parties A and
B communicating as follows.
1. A → B: EncPB (concat(NA, A))
2. B → A: EncPA(concat(NA, NB , B))
3. A → B: EncPB (concat(NB))
After that, A and B compute sid = {NA, A}PB , {NA, NB , B}PA , {NB}PB
and the session key seskeyΠ = hash(NA, NB , sid,A,B), where hash(·) is a hash
function.
Π has mBR′ security because of the following.
– It is trivial to see that the protocol is functional. And because the session key
is computed by hashing the concatenation of some uniformly chosen nonces,
the session key is distributed uniformly.
– Π has strong partnering because we add (sid,A,B) into the session string
according to the technique mentioned in Section 2.2.
– In the related protocol pi, both parties contribute nonces. Furthermore, there
is a mechanised proof of occultness for pi by Cortier et al. [12].
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown an approach of using an automatic technique designed originally
for Dolev–Yao models to verify security of public-key-based key exchange pro-
tocols in a computational model. The full computational model is reduced to a
simpler one first, before we apply a mechanisable technique to establish a secu-
rity proof. Although the technique was first designed for checking a property in
the Dolev–Yao model, we have shown that property also implies security in our
simpler computational model. Therefore, the automatic technique proposed by
Cortier et al. [12] can be used here to achieve a computationally sound security
proof.
This work can be extended in some directions. Firstly, we want to know how
the computational model can be extended, for example to modelling symmetric
key encryption, while our approach remains applicable. Secondly, it may be
possible to design an automatic technique to establish a security proof directly
in the cNR-mBR′ model, e.g. using Hoare logic. This may allow us to treat
more types of protocols than using the indirect method in this paper. Thirdly,
because it is always hard to apply automatic techniques on full computational
models, it would be interesting to find more modular approaches, e.g. reducing
the complexity of models, and then designing automated proofs in the simpler
models.
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